

ATTACHMENT 1OCI COURIER SYSTEM1. Size and Supervision

OCI maintains its own Courier System consisting of [ ] full-time staff employees with Special Clearances ( [ ] ). The [ ] GS-4 couriers are on loan from the Mail and Courier Branch and perform full-time services for OCI. All couriers operate under the direct supervision of the Support Staff and their official duties are monitored by the Security Office/OCI. No attempt is made to monitor the off-duty time of these couriers.

2. Procurement

Procurement of internal couriers (GS-4s) is usually accomplished by personal contact and recommendation of a senior courier or in consultation with the Chief, Mail and Courier Branch, Office of Logistics. External couriers (GS-7s) who perform a more responsible role may be chosen in the same manner from among experienced Agency couriers, but more often are selected from promising young careerists in OCI whose intelligence, neatness, dependability, and unquestioned loyalty merit promotion to this grade. The Chief, Support Staff, OCI, makes final determination in the appointment of all OCI couriers. Appointees to courier positions in OCI show remarkable stability, and the low rate of attrition is attributed to personal loyalty and job satisfaction.

3. Clearances

OCI couriers are cleared for access to classified information, including TOP SECRET by the Personnel Security Division, Office of Security, and are designated Alternate TOP SECRET Control Officers by the CIA TOP SECRET Control Officer. In addition, they have been issued clearances for handling CI and Special Indicator materials by the Security Office, OCI, and have been granted "Q" clearance by the Security Officer, OSI, to handle restricted data. Special clearances issued by outside agencies authorizing couriers access to their security areas (i.e. the Pentagon, AEC Building, etc.) is arranged by OCI on a mutually acceptable basis. At the time of this inspection all clearances were current. Provision is made by the Office of Security, OCI, to make this an automatic annual procedure--at the same time to recover special clearances of individuals who may be relieved from this assignment.

4. Courier Responsibility and Workload

a. The [ ] internal couriers handle the receipt and distribution of classified mail within the sensitive area of OCI and perform

office messenger service within the confines of "M" and "Q" buildings. Classified materials, destined for delivery outside OGI and not requiring special handling, are delivered to the Mail and Courier Branch, Office of Logistics, for processing.

b. The duties of external couriers involve delivery of CI Special Indicator mail to Special Indicator Centers, and to authorized individuals.

## 5. Special Centers

a. Special Centers are security-approved areas located throughout the intelligence community and specific offices in which additional security safeguards have been installed for the storage and safeguarding of CI Special Indicator mail. Within CIA these centers are located in the office of the DCI, DD/I, DD/P, OSI, OGI, ORR, OC and OS.

b. Scheduled deliveries to the more important Special Centers and outside offices include the office of the President, the Executive Offices of the White House (Special Assistant for Security Operations, Operations Coordination Board, the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities, and the Executive Secretary, National Security Council), the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Atomic Energy Commission, and the National Indications Center. When a courier is required to deliver CI Special Indicator material to persons outside of the Special Centers, he is charged with the responsibility of remaining with the material at all times. For example: If CI Special Indicator material is called for by the Vice President, the courier would proceed to that office, deliver the material to Mr. Nixon personally, and remain in his office while the material was reviewed. After reviewing, the Vice President would return the material to the courier.

c. These daily high-level contacts are essential to the proper conduct of Agency business. Obviously, the calibre of individuals selected for this duty should reflect credit upon the Agency. We consider that grade GS-7 is commensurate with the responsibilities involved, and therefore, justified despite the fact that grade GS-7 for courier positions in other Governmental agencies is almost unheard of. It was reported that NSA has only recently elevated their top couriers to this grade--allegedly because of the precedent established by the Agency.

## 6. Courier Receipts

There is ample evidence that in the transmission of "non-sensitive" OGI mail, couriers adhere strictly to Agency Regulation ☐, which requires the use of Courier Receipts, for the transmission of all SECRET and TOP

25X1

25X1 SECRET material. For OCI Special Indicator material, Courier Receipt Form No. 1537, is habitually employed in compliance with Agency Regulation [redacted]

7. Transportation

a. Two sedans and a station wagon registered to CIA by GSA and carrying U.S. Government licenses are assigned by the Agency Motor Pool for the exclusive use of OCI couriers. Couriers act as chauffeurs and usually travel in pairs with one notable exception--the 0500 run to the Pentagon.

b. The courier assigned to make the run to the Atomic Energy Commission at Germantown, Maryland, is driven to the Matomic Building at 1717 H Street where he boards the AEC shuttle bus direct to the AEC building site. There have been few occasions for OCI couriers to travel great distances to deliver CI material (in 1958 when the President was staying at Augusta, Georgia). Transportation in such cases is by first-class commercial carrier; the courier travels alone but is armed.

8. Evaluation of Security of OCI Courier System

a. The fact that during the past five years there has been no record of lost or compromised classified materials traceable to a breach of security on the part of OCI couriers is gratifying, but is not proof that the OCI Courier System is completely secure.

b. This enviable record could be impaired tomorrow should an accident occur to the armed courier on the daily 0500 run to the Pentagon. Without [redacted]

25X1 [redacted] there exists the possibility of serious compromise of classified information and damage to the National Security.

c. Casual concern on the part of supervisors and monitors in accounting for couriers' time away from headquarters creates unnecessary security hazards. Couriers are instructed to make authorized stops only, but there is no daily check of speedometer readings or examination of drivers' trip ticket (if used) to verify this. Clandestine contacts are thus made possible and under existing conditions may completely escape detection.

d. Constant, repetitious indoctrination of couriers with their individual responsibilities for the security of classified materials is effective and should continue.

e. The functions of OCI internal courier system can be incorporated into the official Agency Courier System without loss of efficiency or forfeiture of security.

f. The extreme sensitivity of the materials involved; the extent of clearances required and the abnormal hours external couriers are called upon to work in OCI, make it desirable to restrict this activity to a relatively few individuals.

#### 9. Conclusions and Recommendations

Security of the OCI Courier System is jeopardized not so much by lack of compliance with prescribed security procedures as by failure to provide the courier with the proper means to safeguard classified material while in transit. It is

##### Recommended that:

a. A two-way radio telephone be installed in all vehicles used for courier service.



d. Courier drivers be issued a trip ticket similar to that used by commercial cab drivers to properly account for their whereabouts. Daily speedometer readings of the vehicle to be checked against each completed trip ticket.

e. OCI continue the operation of its own external courier service under its special authority.

